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BOOK REVIEWS
The Inter-American Security System and the Cuban Crisis.* Edited
by Lyman M. Tondel, Jr. New York: Oceana Publications. 1964.
Pp. 96. $3.75.
Disarmament.* Edited by Lyman M. Tondel, Jr. New York: Oceana
Publications. 1964. Pp. 98. $3.95.
Everyone knows-with varying degrees of awareness or repression
-that political power is managed in the world today within a retarded
legal and institutional framework, and that the presence of a 'balance
of terror' cannot and will not insure peace. If there is-among men and
nations-a growing restlessness and impulsiveness on the one hand, and
a suicidal affirmation of responsibility and integrity on the other, these
frightfully recurrent human potentialities for tragedy are conditioned
ultimately by our polycentric global institutional framework within
which man today 'manages,' or precariously balances, power with a
built-in suicidal calculus. No wonder then that, under the stilted camouflage of supreme courage, men resort today to meta-politics, occultism, and other magic escapes into relative or even absolute non-involvement.
The two studies under review here recognize a need to transcend
politics, but in the direction of institutionalizing and legalizing the
problems of international power management through furtherance of
the Rule of Law as the only alternative to the rule of force and the
conditions of chaos. The two studies are products of the proceedings of
the Hammarskj6ld Forums originated by James N. Rosenberg and
Grenville Clark to involve members of the bar in a discussion of major questions of contemporary politics, with an emphasis upon their
legal implications and with a long-range view of furthering the understanding among attorneys of the workings of the Rule of Law. While
practical and realistic men may not easily persuade themselves that what
is mandatory or necessary is also possible, the editor of the Forums,
Mr. Tondel, holds wisely and with temperate hope that "World Law
may be impractical, or impossible of achievement at this stage of human history, but these steps and others may have marked the way towards some of the elements of a world at peace under law" (Cuban
Crisis, p. ix). The participants in the Forums were legal scholars of
international repute and top political experts deeply involved in the
particular subject matter under discussion. The resum6s of the forum
proceedings follow closely the outlines of the working papers, and a
useful bibliography is in each case appended.
* Background papers and proceedings of the Third and Fourth Hammarskjild

Forums, published for the New York City Bar Association.
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The forum on the October 1962 Cuban crisis elucidates mainly the legal and political questions touching the actions of the Organization of American States (OAS) within the United Nations Charter, and the significance of the Monroe Doctrine today for the defense
of the Western Hemisphere. Professor Oliver, from the University of
Pennsylvania, the author of the working paper on Cuba, argued that
the United States, acting in the Cuban crisis, considered the OAS as
a kind of 'clearing-house' for legalizing its actions; however, Sr. Nunez
proudiy retorted that Argentina had its army, navy, and air force committed in the case; and Mr. Abram Chayes from the Department of
State politely pointed out that "the action was a concerted action"
where eleven nations of the hemisphere had contributed their contingents (pp. 39-41). The discussion repeatedly rubbed in the Latin
Americans' claim that the OAS was ultimately an implementation of
their idea from the year 1820, to which the United States responded
only tardiiy and rather inadequately. The Monroe Doctrine, for example, was only a partial implementation of the Latin Americans' demand
for an inter-American security system, to which demand the United
States did not respond for more than a century. Also, it was pointed
out that it was mainly the Latin Americans who fought in San Francisco in 1945 to have the idea of hemispheric security covered by the
UN Charter, notably article 51, which guarantees "the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the UN" (p. 45). In contrast, article 53 maintains that
"no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements . . .
without authorization from the Security Council. . .

."

In previous in-

stances of OAS action, the Russians had insisted that the Security
Council clear its actions under article 53, while in the Cuban crisis of
October 1962, the Russians made no such demands for the first time.
It was suggested that this was a precedent for legitimizing the invocation of article 51 independently of article 53; i.e., sidestepping Security
Council action (p. 53). The problem rests really in defining "armed
attack," and Sr. Urutria expressed the consensus of the forum when
he maintained that "an armed attack in our atomic age starts when you
start building bases and putting missiles a few miles from the continent.
... When a missile is fired it is too late to take defensive action" (p. 48).
But what about our missile bases near the Soviet border? The participants should have pointed out that an "armed attack" when Russians
act is not the same as an "armed attack" when the United States acts.
The question of legality is here dependent upon motivations and intentions. The American action in the Cuban crisis was considered a case
of "anticipatory collective self-defense." In any case, Latin Americans
scored strong points: the discussion tended to show that it was their
efforts and not those of the United States which enabled the action
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against Russia and Castro to pass as legitimate and legal within the
purview of international law and international organization.
It is risking subjectivism to discuss-within a single forum-so
involved a problem 'as disarmament. The working paper on disarmament was prepared by Professor L. Henkin from Columbia University,
and it rests on the recognition that "disarmament can be acceptable only
if it serves better, or as well, the purposes for which nations build and
maintain armaments . . ." (p. 5). This is, of course, to say that the

problem of disarmament is not really the problem of disarmament. Yet,
Professor Henkin states in the same breath that the pressures to disarm
have not been great enough, that "we are not sufficiently afraid of
war" (p. 47). This sounds too plausible to be true. And in fact it is
not true, because sufficient fear from war, inducing disarmament, would
not solve the problems of peace. Armaments are effects rather than
causes; removal of armaments would not yet remove the causes of
armaments. The plausibility of Professor Henkin's claim depends entirely upon forgetting the mentioned institutional framework. If we
pay sufficient heed to the institutional trappings of our hopelessly polycentric world, we are bound to conclude that even successfully accomplished disarmament projects would not alter one iota in the arena of
politics; they would merely reflect or condition a temporary respite or
reduction of tensions. And while tension-reduction may further enhance
the chances of tension-reduction, the problem of disarmament still is
not the problem of disarmament.
What the forum on disarmament lost with one hand, it gained with
the other: the discussants, presuming the possibility of disarmament,
were led to point out how much any eventual violation of an eventually
instituted disarmament agreement or treaty would immediately cease
to remain a merely legal problem and become a hot political question,
particularly if those upon whose compliance the success of any disarmament treaty really and mainly depends-the major powers-become involved in violations (p. 61). Furthermore, the discussants show
how inspection, particularly in the United States, would run into insurmountable institutional obstacles (pp. 37-40). We take very seriously the inviolability of property, the immunity of business records
from inspection, constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search
and seizure, patent rights, etc. American courts would find themselves
in a quandary: the requirements of effective inspection would frequently clash with constitutional guarantees against search and seizure. The
high American constitutional standards would thus seriously hamper
an effective implementation of an inspection system.
One may well ask here how could a treaty be signed that clashed
with our laws? In the Missouri v. THollandP decision, the United States
1252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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Supreme Court held that a congressional law implementing a treaty
can evade the usual standards of constitutionality, because the treaty is
concluded "under the authority of the United States ' 2 and not under
the Constitution. Yet, American courts have refused to apply in California the human rights provisions of the UN Charter (to which the
United States was and is a treaty partner) as the law of the land,
superseding discriminatory state laws.
Perhaps Mr. Dean's point that one could "convince practically
everybody in the world of the good intentions of the United States
except the scholarly world of American Universities" (p. 57) is somewhat overdone. Not that one is not readily reminded here of the contortious sentimentalizing of some of our avant-gardistically inclined
colleagues who sincerely believe, in a fit of moral simplicity, that the
road toward peace resembles the pavement of Constitution Avenue
and that beautiful intentions are in and of themselves bound to move
mountains, so that we can consequently dispense with armaments.
Disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet
Union are indeed deadlocked. We ask the Russians to sacrifice their
advantage, secrecy, before we pay with our advantage, nuclear superiority; while the Russians, in turn, demand that we sacrifice our nuclear
superiority before they abandon secrecy and permit inspection. The
participants of the Forums try to dispel the notion that our position on
disarmament, where we demand inspection first in order to insure
meaningful disarmament afterwards, could be consistently maintained
were we not deadlocked with the Russians, in view of the implications
of inspection within our constitutional system. The implication is left
that we would encounter as many difficulties with what we think is only
the Russians' sacrifice as we do facing the prospects of giving up our
nuclear superiority which their disarmament plans consistently demand.
This is rather hypothetical and requires us to forget that the real problems would be sanctions against violations and not relative constitutional obstacles to effective inspection. However, all of this only brings
us back to the points made at the outset.
The problem of tacit agreements, or what is called 'disarmament
by examples,' is barely mentioned. Since then, the Johnson administration has boldly undertaken exemplary disarmament gestures which,
unfortunately though predictably, were not even partly reciprocated
by the Russians. Mr. John McNaughton from the Department of Defense ably discusses unilateral arms control measures designed to prevent war by miscalculation or accident (pp. 50-53), a topic he brilliantly handled at the First International Arms Control and Disarmament Symposium at Ann Arbor in 1962, since published.
21Id.

at 422.
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The two booklets are refreshing to read. They contain arguments
and points made by men whose backgrounds and involvements accustomed them to "call a spade a spade." The task of translating political
issues into legal ones, and ultimately transforming the polycentric political world into a monocentric legal and institutional one, is an eminently practical task. If this task will be shirked by those who know
what must be done, it will be done by others whom only God can
forgive or understand. While it is not true that ill-will is so disproportionately divided, or that no common ground exists between those
concerned (the test-ban treaty is an example), at least there are men
who know that the Rule of Law is always preferable to the rule of
men; and even Communists are coming around to see that the Hobbesian solution of the crude rule of some men, however therapeutic
to some for some of the time, is hell for most of the people most of
the time. The problem of peace can be tackled, if it can be, by an
effective global legitimization of the Rule of Law, and its realization
requires that men have persistence, endurance, courage, and magnanimity. The HammarskjSld Forums are an encouraging and laudable
step in the right direction.
VICTOR ZITTA**

A Treatise on the Law of Contracts. Third Edition. By Samuel
Williston. Revised by Walter H. E. Jaeger.* Mount Kisco: Voorhis
& Co., Inc. 1957-1963. Vols. 7; pp. xxii, 826; xv, 1095; xii, 937;
ix, 1167; xii, 903; ix, 727; viii, 1047. $20 per vol.
In the realm of music, the work of the symphonic synthesist, the
recapitulator in wholly orchestral terms of a great operatic statement,
is similar in many regards to the work of the reviser of a great and
classic treatise in the domain of the law: the symphonic synthesist
must attempt to give new life to the work by reforming its principal
themes in the musical idiom of the day, which he does by rendering the
main ideas in a new union with linking material which, together, while
avoiding any alteration of the original thought, result in a new rendition which is consonant with the older statement and wholly identifiable
with it, yet which radiates with new brilliance the grandeur of the
original. In like manner, the reviser of a classic statement of the law,
one with the symphonic compass of Williston's treatise on contracts
or Wigmore's treatise on evidence, essays the task of reorganizing the
principal themes of the master and of adding new strains to these
themes so to frame a modern statement of the law which, while current and up-to-date, will avoid any alteration of the original statement
that would make the revision a mere masquerader in the garments and
** Professor, Department of Political Science, Marquette University.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University.

